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The first neuroimaging study of real-time brain activity during insight problem solving was conducted almost ten years ago. Many 
subsequent studies have used high-resolution event-related potentials (ERPs) and event-related functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the temporal dynamics and neural correlates of insight. Recent results on the neural underpinnings 
of insight have led researchers to propose a neural framework referred to as the “insightful brain”. This putative framework repre-
sents the neural basis of the cognitive and affective processes that are involved in insight. The insightful brain may involve nu-
merous brain regions, including the lateral prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, hippocampus, superior temporal gyrus, fusiform 
gyrus, precuneus, cuneus, insula and cerebellum. Functional studies have demonstrated that the lateral prefrontal cortex is respon-
sible for mental set shifting and breaking during insight problem solving. The cingulate cortex is involved in the cognitive conflict 
between new and old ideas and progress monitoring. The hippocampus, superior temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus form an inte-
grated functional network that specializes in the formation of novel and effective associations. The effective transformation of 
problem representations depends on a non-verbal visuospatial information-processing network that comprises the precuneus and 
cuneus. The insula reflects cognitive flexibility and the emotional experience that is associated with insight. The cortical control 
of finger movements relies on the cerebellum. 
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The term “insight” describes an experience that is related to 
a state of understanding, which emerges into one’s con-
scious awareness with sudden abruptness. Insight is the in-
ner process that problem solvers establish as the gestalt re-
lationship between means and goals after realizing the 
breadth of the problem or the manner by which the goal 
may be achieved from the initial state through observation. 
Interest in the topic of insight and insightful problem solv-
ing can be traced to early works of Gestalt psychologists [1]. 
Reserchers proposed the insight learning theory based on 
his observation of apes and defined the concept “insight” 
scientifically for the first time [2]. According to Köhler, 
insight, as a problem-solving process, is not trial-and-error 
but a sudden and gestalt understanding of the problem’s 
elements. Interest in insight has waned since the early days 
of the Gestalt psychologists, but a renewed interest emerged 
in the beginning of the 21st century. Recent neuroimaging 
studies have revealed the initial neural correlates of the 
cognitive processes that underlie insight phenomena. Re-
searchers have encountered numerous difficulties in the 
investigation of brain-based insight, but novel experimental 
materials and methodologies (e.g., fMRI and ERPs) have 
been designed to elucidate the brain mechanisms of insight. 
Insight plays an important and indispensable role in creative 
thinking, which promotes the development of human society 
and science and technology. Many great scientific and 
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technological inventions and scientific discoveries have 
been solved through insight, including the delineation of 
Archimedes’ principle and the discovery of the benzene ring 
structure. Many original studies on the neural basis of in-
sight have been published in the decade following the first 
neuroimaging study on insight. This research on the neural 
underpinnings of insight has led to a neural framework that 
is referred to as the “insightful brain”. This putative frame-
work represents the neural basis that underlies the cognitive 
and affective processes of insight. The insightful brain likely 
involves numerous brain regions (Figure 1), including the 
lateral prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, hippocampus, 
superior temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, precuneus, cuneus, 
insula and cerebellum. This study reviewed cognitive neu-
roscience studies on insight and the roles of the different 
brain areas that participate in the insightful brain. 
1  Prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is an important brain region in 
insight. The PFC primarily includes the dorsolateral pre-
frontal (DLPFC), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), 
orbital frontal cortex (OFC) and the medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC). The PFC is an executive system and coordinating 
center of psychological activity, and this area exhibits dif-
ferent activation patterns during most higher psychological 
processes [3–6]. Insight, which is a thinking process, is un-
doubtedly associated with the PFC. Previous studies have 
shown that insight is generally linked with the DLPFC and 
ventral PFC [7]. 
Goel and Vartanian [7] adopted high spatial resolution 
neuroimaging techniques to investigate the neural correlates 
of insight that underlie matchstick problem solving. The 
role of the PFC in a hypothesis-generation task involving 
set shifts was examined in 13 normal subjects who under-
went fMRI during the completion of Match Problems and 
baseline tasks. Subjects determined the number of possible 
solutions for Match Problems in each trial. Successful solu-
tions indicate set shifts. Subjects evaluated the accuracy of 
hypothetical solutions to Match Problems in the baseline 
condition. Comparisons of Match Problems versus baseline 
trials revealed activation in the right VLPFC and left 
DLPFC. A further comparison of successfully versus un-
successfully completed Match Problems revealed activation 
in the right VLPFC, left middle frontal gyrus and left frontal 
pole. The baseline task exhibited greater activation in the 
right occipital cortex than Match Problems, but this differ-
ence did not reach significance. These results suggest that 
the right VLPFC is a critical component of the neural 
mechanisms of insight problem solving. The activation in 
the right VLPFC that was associated with successful versus 
unsuccessful match problem solutions may be due to an 
experience of insight. However, this hypothesis is weakened 
by lesioning data [8], and several imaging studies [9–11] 
that have associated activation in right temporal lobe struc-
tures with the experience of insight did not observe activa-
tion of the right VLPFC. One neuroimaging study that fo-
cused on solution-induced insight revealed that activation in 
the right hippocampus [10], but not the right PFC, was as-
sociated with the experience of insight. Neuroimaging stud-
ies on creative thinking also support that the right PFC is 
not associated with the “Aha!” experience. These studies 
[12–14] revealed that the right PFC was involved in 
ill-structure problem solving, which suggests that the right 
PFC may be associated with problem presentation restruc-
turing. Therefore, activation of the right PFC may reflect 
the processes of presentation restructuring or set shifting. 
However, these studies do not suggest that the right PFC 
was responsible only for the breaking of mental set and 
presentation restructuring. The right PFC is an indispensa-
ble and necessary functional base for the breaking of mental 
set and representation restructuring. Two reasons support 
this function. First, the breaking of mental set is one of the 
most important cognitive processes underlying insight, and 
this process could not be realized by the activation of a sin-
gle brain region. Insight problem-solving tasks compared to 
baseline tasks activated both the right PFC and the left 
DLPFC. Successful insight problem-solving tasks, but not 
unsuccessful insight problem-solving tasks, activated the  
 
Figure 1  The neural framework of the insightful brain. The left image is a lateral view, the middle image is median sagittal section, and the right image is a 
bottom view. The insightful brain likely involves distributed brain regions, including the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), cingulate cortex (including the ACC 
and PCC), hippocampus, superior temporal gyrus (STG), fusiform gyrus, precuneus, cuneus, insula and cerebellum. These brain regions exhibit numerous 
neural connections with each other. These areas form an integrated network that is the neural basis of the cognitive and affective processes of insight. 
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left middle frontal gyrus and left frontal pole [7]. Second, 
some studies have observed activation of the left PFC in the 
breaking of mental set and presentation restructuring [15]. 
Luo et al. [16] employed a Chinese characters chunk de-
composition task to examine the role of PFC in insight 
problem solving. These authors asked participants to decode 
two Chinese characters and form two new Chinese charac-
ters. The entire process of problem solving was divided into 
three phases: the question phase, the hint phase and the so-
lution phase. Two experimental conditions were used, the 
tight chunk decomposition (TCD) and the loose chunk de-
composition (LCD). The problem in the TCD condition 
could be solved only if participants decomposed the char-
acter into separate strokes and moved some of the resulting 
strokes from the right character to the left character. Partic-
ipants in the LCD condition could decompose the character 
into separate radicals and move one of the resulting radicals 
to the left character. Statistical analyses primarily focused 
on the LCD items that were successfully solved during the 
question phase and the TCD items that were solved during 
the hint phase. The results demonstrated that TCD in the 
hint presentation phase correlated with more activation in 
many bilateral frontal brain areas (e.g., superior frontal gy-
rus, middle frontal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus) relative 
to LCD. The LCD items also activated these frontal brain 
areas. The only difference between the two types of prob-
lem solving was the degree of activation in these frontal 
brain areas, which suggests that the PFC participated in the 
TCD and LCD problem-solving tasks. Additionally, only 
TCD problem solving activated the right middle frontal gy-
rus, left inferior frontal gyrus, and two small brain areas 
adjacent to the right inferior frontal gyrus. The dissociation 
of brain activation areas that are associated with different 
subsequent phases is difficult due to the lower temporal 
resolution of fMRI. Tang et al. [17] adopted real-time ERPs 
to investigate the time course of insight in a Chinese chunk 
decomposition task because ERPs exhibit superior temporal 
resolution. These authors demonstrated that the unsolved 
problems elicited a more positive right frontal P150 during 
the phase of problem presentation compared to the solved 
problems, but the solved problems elicited a more positive 
left frontal P150 at the same phase compared to the un-
solved problems. The unsolved problems in the hint presen-
tation phase elicited a right frontal P2, but the solved prob-
lems elicited a left frontal P2. These results demonstrated 
that the problems that remained unsolved after the hint 
phase did not elicit a right frontal P2 compared to the prob-
lems that were solved with the help of hints, which suggests 
that the right frontal brain did not process problem difficulty. 
These data suggest that right frontal brain was prominently 
activated in the TCD problems and activated in the LCD 
problems, which also activated the PFC bilaterally. This 
activation might reflect the processing of tightness or prob-
lem presentation. However, the brain regions that were ac-
tivated only in the TCD problems, such as the right frontal 
middle gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus and the left inferi-
or frontal gyrus, may primarily reflect the breaking of mental 
set and set shift. 
Studies using a moderate difficult insight problem-solving 
task revealed that insight events activated the right inferior 
frontal gyrus, right frontal middle gyrus and left inferior 
frontal gyrus compared to non-insight events [18]. However, 
the right PFC exhibited significant activation in the insight 
condition but not the non-insight condition, which suggests 
the participation of the right PFC in insight. One study di-
vided the time course of problem solving into three stages 
and employed a more detailed analysis of the activation 
areas during the early and late stages to determine the role 
of the right PFC in insight. Only the right ventral PFC ex-
hibited significant activation in the 3000–3500 ms time 
window post-problems (i.e., during the late stage). The late 
stage approximates the period of problem solution. There-
fore, the right ventral PFC may reflect the meta-cognitive 
awareness of solution-obtaining or successful insight [18]. 
Anderson et al. [19] adopted the compound remote associa-
tion (CRA) and word fragment tasks to investigate the neu-
ral correlates of insight problem solving at different stages. 
These authors demonstrated that solved and unsolved prob-
lems activated the left inferior (lateral) PFC in a 6-s time 
course prior to responding and 4–10 s after responding. 
However, this area exhibited differential activations across 
the two problem types. Activation in the left inferior PFC in 
solution trials was not significantly greater than in other 
brain areas (e.g., anterior cingulated cortex, ACC) prior to 
response generation. However, the left inferior PFC exhib-
ited significantly less activation than other brain areas after 
response generation. In contrast, left inferior PFC activity in 
non-solution trials was greater throughout the task. This 
psychological process may be described as solution seeking 
or the identification of a solution to the problems prior to 
insight, but it primarily reflected the accomplishment of 
solution seeking after insight for a solved problem. However, 
this process remained a solution-seeking process for an un-
solved problem. Activation in the left inferior PFC reflected 
goal-directed cognitive control and retrieval efforts for in-
formation that was relevant to the solution. These research-
ers also adopted a word fragment task to reexamine the ef-
fect and exclude the confounding time-accumulated effect 
of neuroimaging and the highly variable response times. 
Participants in this experiment were shown a word fragment, 
such as “-a-a-a”, and an associated word, such as “hockey”, 
and were given 10 s to complete the fragment (the intended 
answer is “Canada”). The study used scans at 1 and 3 s to 
reflect pre-solution activity and scans at 7 and 9 s to reflect 
post-solution activity to compare the participants’ activity 
prior to response generation. Activation in the left inferior 
PFC in solution trials was significantly greater than in other 
brain areas (e.g., ACC) prior to solution. However, the left 
inferior PFC exhibited insignificantly less activation than 
other brain areas after solution until the end of feedback. 
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The unsolved problems also prominently activated the left 
inferior PFC. These results suggested that the inferior part 
of the left lateral PFC was primarily responsible for the ac-
tive solution-seeking process, especially the searching and 
retrieving of information in long-term memory on solution. 
Several researchers have also investigated the brain 
mechanisms of prototype-induced insight. Qiu et al. [20] 
adopted the many-to-many prototype heuristic paradigm to 
examine the neural correlates of insight. These authors 
demonstrated that insight events activated the left middle 
frontal middle gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, but non- 
insight events did not activate these areas. Non-insight 
events only activated the medial frontal cortex. These re-
sults suggest that the left middle frontal middle gyrus and 
left inferior frontal gyrus play important roles in the break-
ing of mental set and the formation of novel associations. A 
one-to-one comparison of the unsolved and solved problems 
revealed that the PFC did not exhibit any activation differ-
ences in the two types of problems [21]. The solving of 
these problems involved less breaking of the mental set in 
the one-to-one prototype heuristic condition. Therefore, 
participants may use prototype heuristics more directly to 
solve problems. The participants also solved the target 
problem with the assistance of prototype riddle problems in 
the many-to-many condition. However, this condition in-
cluded many target riddle problems in a single trial, which 
reduced the mental set more than set shift in the many-to- 
many condition because the participants should have ex-
cluded the set that was elicited by the other prototype riddle 
problems in the same trial. Therefore, the participants 
adopted a larger mental set that was elicited by the proto-
type problems to solve the target problems consciously or 
unconsciously in the one-to-one prototype heuristic condi-
tion as opposed to the many-to-many condition. The left 
middle frontal middle gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus may 
be associated with set shift and working memory. The re-
sults on the neural correlates of insight in the one-to-one 
condition demonstrated that successful problem solving, as 
opposed to the successful recognition of solutions, elicited a 
more negative deflection in the left inferior frontal gyrus 
from 300 to 350 ms after the onset of the target, which sug-
gests that the ERP component is linked with semantic re-
trieval [22]. Previous neuroimaging studies on working 
memory have also revealed that the left inferior frontal gyrus 
is responsible for semantic retrieval [23]. Anderson et al. 
[19] demonstrated that the left inferior PFC primarily rep-
resents working memory. Goel and Vartanian [7] also 
demonstrated that the DLPFC was primarily responsible for 
working memory and conflict resolution. These findings 
suggest that the left inferior frontal gyrus is primarily in-
volved in working memory, but the left frontal middle gyrus 
is primarily associated with set shift. Jung-Beeman et al. [11] 
also observed that solved problems exhibited more activa-
tion in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and left medial 
frontal lobe compared to unsolved problems, although the 
activation in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus was not sig-
nificant. The CRA task involves more novel association and 
less mental set than the guessing riddle task, and therefore, 
the activation of the left middle frontal gyrus was not sig-
nificant. Other studies on insight problem solving in proto-
type heuristic tasks have predefined insight problems as 
problems that generally elicit more positivity in the time 
window from 1200 to 1500 ms after the onset of problems 
in the control condition. The origin of the difference wave 
was located in the left inferior frontal gyrus [24]. The left 
inferior frontal gyrus was associated with the breaking of 
mental set and the resolution of cognitive conflict in this 
context. Luo et al. [15] presented a series of routine and 
insight riddle problems to participants and asked them to 
take initiative and solve these problems prior to the presen-
tation of the solutions. This research required participants to 
judge whether their generated solutions were identical to the 
subsequently presented solutions. Brain activation was sim-
ultaneously obtained using fMRI. Neuroimaging results 
revealed that “Aha!” events exhibited more activation in the 
anterior part of the left lateral PFC and other brain areas 
than “non-Aha!” events, and the difficult-to-comprehend 
events, but not the “non-Aha!” events, activated the bilateral 
PFC. There is a difference in difficulty between the “Aha” 
events and the difficult-to-comprehend events. Therefore, 
the aforementioned results suggest that the bilateral PFC is 
involved in the cognitive processing of problem difficulty. 
The difference in the cognitive processes of both events is 
that the key process underlying the “Aha!” events was the 
breaking of mental set, but the cognitive process underlying 
the difficult-to-comprehend events was the maintenance of 
mental set. Therefore, the breaking of mental set was pri-
marily associated with the right PFC rather than left PFC 
because the difficult-to-comprehend events also activated 
the left PFC. Random effect analysis revealed that all three 
blocks were associated with robust left lateral PFC activity 
relative to the resting state. The activity in left lateral PFC 
did not decrease from the first block to the second and third 
blocks, which suggests that the left lateral PFC was not as-
sociated with problem familiarity. The aforementioned 
analysis revealed that the left lateral PFC was responsible 
for the cognitive processing of problem difficulty, and it 
was associated with set shift. In brief, the left PFC is pri-
marily associated with working memory, problem difficulty 
and the set shift that underlie insight problem solving. If the 
task-related activation areas were adjacent to the superior 
part of the left lateral PFC, it was easier for these areas to 
assist the right PFC in the breaking of mental set. If the ac-
tivation areas were adjacent to the inferior part of the left 
lateral PFC, it was easier for these areas to participate in 
working memory. 
Several studies have adopted the number reduction task 
(NRT) to investigate the brain mechanism of delayed in-
sight [25,26]. These experiments presented a serial of digits 
to participants and asked them to generate a solution to the 
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problem according to the “identity rule” and the “difference 
rule”. The responses followed a hidden rule of those digits 
in a trial, and this fact was importantly not mentioned to 
participants. The last two responses were always mirrored 
by the prior two responses, but the actual digit strings and 
responses changed from trial to trial. Insight was defined 
when participants finished the task with at least 36 correct 
shortcuts in a single block. Neuroimaging revealed that the 
unsolved problems exhibited more activation in the bilateral 
ventral medial PFC and motor areas. However, the insight-
ful and solved problems exhibited more activation in the 
right dorsal medial PFC and DLPFC. These authors hy-
pothesized that the PFC was associated with rule finding 
and off-line memory in the delayed insight task. The role of 
PFC in insight problem solving is complex, and it is associ-
ated with distributed neural networks. The PFC may be as-
sociated with conscious processing, especially conscious 
awareness, memory retrieval and mental imagery [25]. The 
time point of the occurrence of insight was difficult to iden-
tify due to the unpredictability and suddenness of insight 
and the coarse temporal resolution of fMRI. One study 
adopted high temporal resolution ERPs to capture the time 
course of insight occurrence in a mathematical insight 
problem-solving task and observed activation in the right 
PFC during insight [26]. The mental set in NRT was not 
obvious, but the participants adopted the so-called “identity 
rule” and “difference rule” to solve NRT problems. There-
fore, the NRT included some degree of mental set. The right 
PFC may be involved in the cognitive processes that under-
lie routine strategy selection and the breaking of mental set. 
The PFC is an important control and executive center, 
and it plays a critical role in certain higher cognition pro-
cesses. Insight is a type of human thinking that naturally 
recruits the PFC. Many studies consistently reveal the im-
portant role of the PFC in insight problem solving using 
electrophysiological measures [21–28] and neuroimaging 
techniques [18–20,25,29]. However, the activation patterns 
are different across task types, research paradigms, refer-
ence states and the resolution of neuroimaging techniques. 
These studies consistently demonstrate that insight, as op-
posed to routine, events exhibit activation in the bilateral 
DLPFC and ventral lateral PFC, especially the right ventral 
lateral PFC. Functionally, the bilateral PFC may be associ-
ated with set shift in the insight task. The right lateral PFC 
plays a significant role in the breaking of mental set, which 
is independent of task types. However, the association of 
the left lateral PFC in insight problem solving depends on 
the task type, research approach and the activated areas in a 
task. Insight task activation of the superior part of left lat-
eral PFC increased the probability that this brain area was 
associated with set shift. Activation of the inferior parts of 
the left lateral PFC suggested that this brain area was re-
sponsible for working memory and memory retrieval. In 
addition, the left lateral PFC may be involved in the cogni-
tive processing that underlies problem difficulty and cogni-
tive inhibition. The nature of activation (i.e., activation or 
deactivation) depended on the role that the PFC played in an 
insight task. The PFC is usually involved in general strategy 
cognition and functional modulation. The PFC would be 
activated if it was associated with working memory and 
cognitive inhibition. Individuals without a PFC may per-
form better in solving insight problems if the PFC does not 
participate in cognitive inhibition and control. One lesion 
study and several non-invasive brain stimulation studies 
have reported the aforementioned effect. Patients with focal 
damage to the lateral frontal cortex performed better in in-
sight problem solving than a group of healthy participants. 
These results suggest that the PFC, especially the DLPFC, 
is primarily involved in cognitive inhibition, routine think-
ing and cognitive control. 
2  Cingulate cortex 
The cingulate cortex is an anatomically important part of 
the limbic lobe. The cingulated cortex is located in the cen-
ter of the cerebrum, and it is wrapped around the central 
bundle of nerves known as the corpus callosum. The anteri-
or and caudal parts of the cingulate cortex are significantly 
different in morphology, and this area has been divided into 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC). The cingulate cortex plays an important role 
in responses to monitoring, error detection, cognitive con-
flict, working memory and higher cognition and psycholog-
ical processes that are associated with emotional arousal 
[30–36]. The cingulate cortex is significantly activated dur-
ing insight problem solving. The PCC has been associated 
with insight problem solving, but most studies report an 
association of the ACC with insight [11,22]. This study re-
views the role of the cingulate cortex, including the ACC 
and PCC, in insight problem solving. 
Luo and Niki [10] recorded neural activity using fMRI 
and correlated activity with cognitive insight. These authors 
presented subjects with a series of riddle problems and gen-
eral questions and asked them to actively think and discover 
the correct answer in a given time period. The answer was 
presented to the subjects after a period of time for thinking, 
and brain activities were scanned simultaneously. Insight 
events significantly activated the right anterior cingulated 
cortex relative to non-insight events. The non-insight events 
significantly activated the bilateral PCC and left ACC 
compared to the insight events. Events that were difficult to 
understand (i.e., events that subjects failed to generate a 
correct answer during the problem presentation phase but 
understood the given answer) only activated the left ACC 
compared to non-insight events. The difficult-to-compre-      
hend events did not activate any cingulate regions compared 
to insight events. The insight task consistently activated the 
ACC and the left PFC compared to the resting state. Ran-
dom effect analysis revealed that the activity in the ACC 
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sharply decreased from the first experimental block to the 
second and third blocks, which suggests that the ACC is 
associated with the cognitive conflict between old and new 
ideas. The present study provides a detailed analysis of the 
prominent cingulate areas across various conditions. Insight 
events did not exhibit prominent activation in the left ACC, 
which contrasts the difficult-to-comprehend events. How-
ever, both the non-insight events and the difficult-to-com-     
prehend events exhibited prominent activation in the left 
ACC compared to the insight events. These results suggest 
that the left ACC does not represent a unique mechanism of 
insight, but this area plays a role in a universal strategy 
mechanism. The activity in the left ACC was a function of 
problem type; the difficult-to-comprehend events elicited 
the greatest activation in the left ACC. The activation of the 
left ACC by non-insight events was less than the activation 
by difficult-to-comprehend events but greater than the acti-
vation by insight events. The degree of activation strength 
should be transitive if these events activated the same re-
gion of the left ACC. The activity in the left ACC that is 
elicited by the difficult-to-comprehend events should be 
significantly stronger than the insight events. However, no 
difference in left ACC activity between these two types of 
events is observed, which suggests that the transitive pro-
cess did not exist. Some differences in the exact activation 
regions of the left ACC between the difficult-to-compre-     
hend and insight events has been observed. The left ACC 
may be primarily responsible for cognitive monitoring or 
“early warning” in these events [2]. Previous studies have 
shown that it was difficult for meta-cognition to monitor the 
time course of insight. The activity in the left ACC that was 
elicited by non-insight events was associated with the me-
ta-cognitive monitoring of problem solving. However, the 
activity that was elicited by the difficult-to-comprehend 
events was related to meta-cognitive awareness or the early 
warning of the appearance of a potential mental impasse. 
The similar activities in the left ACC between the diffi-
cult-to-comprehend and insight events may be a product of 
the number of their average trails. These non-differing ef-
fects suggest that an association of the ACC to the breaking 
of mental set and the “Aha!” experience post-solution is not 
necessary. However, the insight events exhibited a promi-
nent activation in the right ACC, which suggests an associa-
tion with cognitive conflict. One explanation is that the in-
sight events were primarily defined as the events in which 
the participants’ solutions did not match the given answers 
(i.e., the participant-generated solutions were better or 
worse than the given solutions, but they were not identical). 
Non-insight events in which participant- generated solutions 
were consistent with the given answers exhibited significant 
activation in the bilateral PCC. The right ACC may be as-
sociated with the detection of cognitive conflicts between 
old and new ideas during insight problem solving and reso-
lution. The specific role of the bilateral PCC is not clear, but 
neuroimaging studies on creative thinking have shown that 
the right PCC is activated in novices operating a digit count 
task [37]. Neuroimaging studies on the neural correlates of 
economic and moral decision-making demonstrate that the 
bilateral PCC (especially the right PCC) is associated with 
the expected reward probability of expected economic utili-
ty [38], expected moral utility, practical moral utility, and 
event probabilities (primarily right PCC) [39]. The PCC 
may assist some motor areas in conflict resolution after the 
prefrontal cortex has monitored the response conflict [40,41]. 
Therefore, the right PCC may be primarily responsible for 
risk and confidence assessment in decision-making, which 
suggests that the participants were more confident in judg-
ing the non-insight response. The left PCC primarily assists 
the right PCC in risk assessment and problem solving, espe-
cially in reaching a final decision. However, Jung-Beeman 
et al. [11] and Qiu et al. [22] used the CRA task and proto-
type heuristic paradigm, respectively, to demonstrate that 
insight problems dominantly activated the left PCC com-
pared to non-insight problems. These two tasks do not in-
volve a cognitive conflict between old and new ideas. The 
ACC, which participates in the detection and resolution of 
cognitive conflict, was not significantly activated. However, 
Jung-Beeman et al. [11] demonstrated that insight and non- 
insight problem solving activated the left PCC, and insight 
problem solving activated this area earlier. Activation of the 
left PCC was likely associated with the act of key pressing 
rather than problem solving because insight problem-solving 
activation was faster than non-insight problem solving, and 
the solving of both types of problems involved key pressing. 
However, Qiu and Zhang hypothesized that the PCC was 
also related to an early warning of mental impasse. 
Aziz-Zadeh et al. [18] presented a series of moderately 
difficult word variants and asked participants to adjust 
non-word letters to form words (e.g., “oxima” was adjusted 
into “axiom”). Comparisons between insight and search 
solutions revealed that the ACC was activated in both con-
ditions, but the activation level was greater in the insight 
condition. These authors divided the process of problem 
solving into three stages and primarily focused on the signal 
change in the question and solution phases to specify the 
role of ACC in insight problem solving. Insight solutions 
dominantly activated the ACC in the solution phase (3 to 
3.5 s interval post anagrams) compared to non-insight solu-
tions, which suggests that the ACC is a critical region for 
the successful solving of insight problems. The monitoring 
of insightful processes by meta-cognition is difficult, and 
the ACC may not be involved in the cognitive monitoring of 
insight solutions. The ACC may work in concert with the 
PFC by evaluating the need for executive control and relay-
ing the need for control to the PFC. Therefore, the ACC is 
part of a tight network that is involved in focused attention, 
monitoring, and executive control, and it may be a neces-
sary component of insight processing. Anderson et al. [19] 
adopted two similar word association tasks (CRA and word 
fragment tasks) to investigate the neural correlates of insight 
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problem solving. The solved problems, but not the unsolved 
problems, activated the left ACC in the 6-s time interval 
prior to responding and in the 4–10 s after responding. The 
left ACC and PFC exhibited the same degree of activation 
prior to insight in the solved trials, but the activity of the 
ACC was significantly stronger than the PFC after insight. 
In contrast, activation of the ACC was weaker throughout in 
the unsolved trials. These authors adopted a word fragment 
task for further investigation. The researchers used scans at 
1 and 3 s to reflect pre-solution activity and scans at 7 and  
9 s to reflect post-solution activity to compare participants’ 
activity prior to response generation. Activation in the left 
ACC in solution trials was significantly smaller than the 
PFC prior to solution. However, the left ACC exhibited 
insignificantly less activation than the PFC after the solution 
to the end of feedback processing. Activity in the left ACC 
was weaker than the PFC throughout. The word fragment 
task is commonly used in memory studies, but it is also ap-
plicable for the examination of the cognitive processes that 
underlie insight due to its gestalt characteristics, such as 
cloze. These data suggest that activation in the PFC is 
linked with retrieval information for the solutions from 
memory, but the left ACC is primarily responsible for goal 
directing and governing during problem solving. Naturally, 
the PFC and ACC exhibit different activation patterns pre- 
and post-solution.  
Luo et al. [29] demonstrated alterations in ACC activa-
tion due to the familiarity of the structure of puzzles. The 
ACC was less activated when the structure of the puzzle 
was known. Event-related fMRI was used to compare the 
neural correlates of the solving of two kinds of puzzles. In 
one condition, the subjects solved a list of puzzles that were 
constructed using different principles. In the other condition, 
the puzzles were constructed using the same principle. 
Therefore, the solvers could allocate some general task 
strategies to solve the puzzles in the second condition. This 
top-down control was relatively difficult to achieve in the 
first condition. Both conditions evoked comparable activi-
ties in the left ACC relative to resting baselines, but the first 
condition evoked more ACC activity than the second condi-
tion. This difference was primarily exhibited in the number 
of voxels. This result implies that the function of the ACC 
in the insightful solving of puzzles was an “early warning 
system” when the top-down control had failed, but the ACC 
did not participate in the regular top-down attentive control. 
The left ACC reflected general top-down information pro-
cessing, but the right ACC reflected early warning pro-
cessing. This interpretation has been supported in subse-
quent studies. Qiu et al. [20] investigated the brain mecha-
nism of insight in the condition of the “many-to-many” 
prototype heuristic. The prototype problems did not signifi-
cantly activate the cingulate cortex, but the solving of pro-
totype problems (insight events), but not target problems 
(non-insight events), dominantly activated the left ACC and 
the right PCC. Therefore, both the left ACC and right PCC 
participate in the solving of prototype problems. If proto-
type problem solving is the process of solution-seeking by 
participants based on their previous experience and 
knowledge, then the target problems were solved using the 
rules hidden in the prototype problem solving, or at least 
inspired by the hidden rules. These results revealed that the 
cingulate cortex was less activated when the participants 
knew the rule or strategy of problem solving. Similar results 
were observed in another study. Darsaud et al. [25] adopted 
an NRT task to investigate the neural correlates of delayed 
insight. Activation in the left ACC and bilateral PCC was 
greater at post-solution than pre-solution. This result implies 
that insight problem solving activates the left and right ACC 
regardless of whether the problem is a predefined insight 
problem or is solved using the insight strategy. 
The cingulate cortex is important for insight problem 
solving. EEG studies on insight also support this view. Qiu 
and Zhang [22] investigated the neural correlates of proto-
type-induced insight in the one-to-one condition. The suc-
cessful problem solving, but not the successful recognition 
of solutions, elicited a more negative deflection in the left 
PCC from 300 to 350 ms after the onset of the target. The 
PCC may have assumed a similar role as that of the ACC 
because the activation in the PCC was only produced by the 
coarse source analysis. The ERP component may be primarily 
responsible for the monitoring and inhibition of mental set 
and cognitive conflict. Mai et al. [42,43] adopted a rid-
dle-guessing task to examine the ERP effect of “insight” 
that was catalyzed by the answer to the riddle. Insightful 
responses induced a difference ERP component that was 
similar to the N400 in the ACC compared to the routine 
responses. Qiu et al. [44,45] also observed similar results. 
Insightful and difficult-to- comprehend responses elicited an 
N400-like difference component relative to the routine re-
sponses. These results suggest that the N400-like difference 
ERP component did not represent the breaking of mental set, 
but it reflected the cognitive conflict that was induced by 
old and new ideas prior to and after providing answers. This 
explanation seems more reasonable. Unfortunately, the 
source analysis results of Qiu et al. [44,45] revealed that the 
difference component of incomprehension did not originate 
in the ACC, but the origin of insight difference component 
was located in the ACC. Qiu et al. [21] and Wang et al. [24] 
further studied the insight processes that are induced by 
successful problem solving by participants’ own initiatives. 
Successfully solved riddles elicited a more negative differ-
ence component in the left ACC in the time course of 1500– 
2000 ms and in the PCC at 2000–2500 ms post-problems 
compared to unsuccessfully solved problems [21]. Prede-
fined insight problems elicited a more negative difference 
component in the right ACC in the 300–800 ms time course 
compared to routine problems [24]. These observations 
suggest that the left ACC was primarily responsible for the 
breaking of mental set and the formation of novel associa-
tion [21], but the right ACC was primarily involved in the 
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detecting and monitoring of cognitive conflict as an index 
of cognitive control [24]. 
In conclusion, considerable research using different in-
sight tasks has been conducted on the cognitive processes 
underlying insight problem solving. Inconsistent operational 
definitions of insight, different methodologies and tech-
niques and various research approaches have been used in 
previous studies on the neural correlates of insight. Howev-
er, the data consistently exhibited an important role for the 
cingulate cortex in insight problem solving. Gaps in the 
specific roles of the cingulate cortex exist, but the present 
study illustrates the functions of the left and right cingulate 
cortex, especially the cognitive function of the ACC in in-
sight problem solving. The left ACC is primarily involved 
in task-related goal directing and governing and the early 
warning of potential mental impasse. The right ACC pri-
marily participates in the detection and resolution of the 
cognitive conflict that is induced by old and new ideas. The 
cognitive functions of the bilateral PCC exhibit some dif-
ferences between various insight tasks. Most studies suggest 
that the right PCC is associated with the assessment of the 
comprehensive progress of problems. The left PCC might 
assist the right PCC and/or cognitive system (primarily the 
PFC) in the measurement of multiple choices and the final 
response. Other studies suggest that the cognitive function 
of the PCC is similar to the ACC, and these areas play the 
same role in insight problem solving. However, this hy-
pothesis has not been validated. 
3  Hippocampus, superior temporal gyrus and 
fusiform gyrus 
The hippocampus, superior temporal gyrus (STG) and fusi-
form gyrus are typical activation regions that are often ob-
served in insight studies. Numerous studies have observed 
activation in the medial temporal lobe, especially the hip-
pocampus, parahippocampus, STG and fusiform gyrus, during 
insight problem solving. The current study focused on the 
functions of the hippocampus, STG and fusiform gyrus due 
to their important roles in insight. The function of the hip-
pocampus [10] and STG [11] is emphasized because the 
first two studies on the neural basis of insight explored the 
roles of these areas in insight problem solving. 
The hippocampus is a major component of the limbic 
system, and it is located in the medial temporal lobe. The 
hippocampus is primarily responsible for spatial memory 
and navigation, but it also has other functions. The hippo-
campus exhibits a well-defined structure in different species. 
These factors contributed to the extensive study of the hip-
pocampus (A journal is named Hippocampus). The hippo-
campus has been investigated in animal studies and human 
studies. Animal studies have primarily examined the impact 
of hippocampal lesions on exploratory behaviors and the 
activation states of hippocampal neurons during the search 
for a road. Human studies have explored the relationship 
between the hippocampus and episodic and declarative 
memory [2]. Redish [46] argued that the function of hippo-
campus in animals and humans is similar. The hippocampus 
functions as a constant corrector of the errors that occurs in 
self-oriented behaviors, episodic recall and the filling of 
vacancies in a scene [2,10]. These functions are typically 
reflected in re-directed animal behaviors. If a path is obvi-
ous and clear, an animal may recover from the loss of the 
path despite hippocampal damage. However, hippocam-
pus-damaged animals find it difficult to identify a path 
when the road is not obvious. Animals can only fulfill self- 
orientation successfully if their actions and external infor-
mation are integrated effectively [2]. A key feature of in-
sight is the re-orientation of thinking or the transformation 
of problem representation. Therefore, the hippocampus may 
participate in insight problem solving. This hypothesis has 
been validated in numerous brain imaging and ERP studies 
on insight. 
Luo and Niki [10] performed the first study on the neural 
mechanisms of insight. These authors applied event-related 
fMRI to record the brain activity of 7 college subjects dur-
ing the insightful solving of riddle problems. Insight events 
markedly activated many distributed brain regions relative 
to the resting state, but the greatest activation was located in 
the right hippocampus. Neuropsychological studies on hu-
man hippocampus damage (e.g., H. M. patient) and previ-
ous neuroimaging studies on normal subjects demonstrated 
that the hippocampus is activated by novel stimuli. Howev-
er, the stimuli and objects that were used in these studies 
(e.g., words and characters) are well-known and common in 
daily life, such as “mosquito” [2], which suggests that the 
activity of the hippocampus was not due to the novelty of 
the stimulus itself. Activity of the hippocampus may be in-
duced by the (novel) associations between riddle problems 
and their answers. This hypothesis has been supported by 
many neuroimaging and ERP/EEG studies. Jung-Beeman et 
al. [11] adopted a CRA task based on connection theory to 
capture the brain mechanisms underlying the formation of 
remote association. The bilateral hippocampus was activat-
ed at the moment of insight, but this activation was not sig-
nificant. More compelling evidence comes from Darsaud  
et al. [25] who adopted fMRI to scan the brain activity of 
repeated attempts and rule finding prior to and after insight. 
The left hippocampus was markedly activated in successful 
solvers compared to unsuccessful solvers. The connections 
between the hippocampus and parahippocampus in suc-
cessful solvers were significantly stronger than in the un-
successful solvers. These observations revealed that the 
significant activation in the left hippocampus was associat-
ed with rule finding. However, the activation of the left 
hippocampus gradually weakened after insight and the dis-
covery of the hidden rule, but the connection between the 
hippocampus and surrounding areas was markedly enhanced. 
These results suggest that the hippocampus reflects the cog-
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nitive processes underlying the forming of novel association, 
and the activity is enhanced by the neural connections and 
associations with surrounding neural structures. These re-
sults fully explain the association of insight with the hippo-
campus [10] in some studies, but others have observed as-
sociations with the parahipp-ocampus [22,24] or temporal 
regions that are adjacent to the hippocampus and the para-
hippocampus gyrus (e.g., STG [11,15] and temporoparietal 
junction [21,25,29]). 
STG is an important temporal area for insight problem 
solving [11,27,45,47,48]. The STG is located in the superior 
part of the lateral temporal lobe. Jung-Beeman et al. [11] 
first discussed the role of the STG in insight problem solv-
ing. These authors adopted the CRA task (e.g., boot, sum-
mer, ground; solutions: camp) to examine the neural corre-
lates of insight problem solving. fMRI revealed an in-
creased signal in the right anterior STG for insight, but not 
non-insight, solutions, and scalp EEG recordings exhibited 
a sudden burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) neural ac-
tivity in the same region just prior to insight (approximately 
0.3 s), but not non-insight, solutions. Previous studies on 
speech comprehension have demonstrated that the STG 
plays an important role in remote semantic integration. 
Therefore, the STG may represent the formation of the nov-
el remote semantic associations that underlie insight prob-
lem solving. Luo et al. [10,15,16,29] also observed activa-
tion in the right STG or its neighboring brain regions in the 
riddle guessing task and the chunk decomposition of Chi-
nese characters task. The process that the subjects used to 
solve a list of puzzles that were constructed by different 
principles significantly activated the right STG (mainly BA 
38) relative to the resting state, but the process of solving 
puzzles that were constructed using the same principle did 
not activate the STG or nearby areas relative to the resting 
state [29]. LCD, but not TCD, problems significantly acti-
vated the right STG (BA 22) during problem solving. The 
right STG was negatively activated across the two problem 
types. The activation in the right STG was negative in both 
the LCD and the TCD conditions, but it was more negative 
in the LCD condition. TCD problems are considered insight 
problems, and the LCD problems are considered routine 
problems [16]. Routine (LCD) problem solving exhibited 
more negative activation in the right STG, which suggests 
that insight (TCD) problem solving exhibited less activation 
in this region. These results verified the outcomes reported 
by Jung-Beeman et al. [11] in the opposite direction, which 
suggests that TCD problem solving is associated with more 
novel and remote associations. Many factors can explain the 
negative activation in the right STG. One factor addresses 
whether the insight problem was solved using the partici-
pants’ own initiatives or passive thinking. The activation in 
the right STG was negative when the insight problem was 
solved with the assistance of a trigger (either a hint or heu-
ristic) because the participants only partially experienced or 
comprehended the novel or remote association (similar to 
outsight) rather than forming and constructing the entire 
novel or remote association using their own initiative. This 
hypothesis was confirmed by Qiu et al. [20] who observed 
that prototype problem solving exhibited greater activation 
in the bilateral STG under the “many-to-many” prototype 
heuristic condition compared to target problem solving. 
However, the prominent activation in these regions did not 
occur in reverse comparisons. The prototype problem was 
solved by participants’ own initiatives, but the target prob-
lem was solved with the assistance of the heuristic that was 
induced by the prototype problem. The two types of prob-
lems were very similar in structure and other aspects, but 
the subjects’ initiatives were different. Therefore, the STG 
was associated with the formation of novel or remote asso-
ciations using initiatives.  
The role of the temporal lobe in insight problem solving 
has been revealed by studies of the hippocampus and STG 
and other brain regions, such as the fusiform gyrus [19,20, 
49], temporal pole [18] and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
[25,47,50], which includes the superior temporal sulcus and 
inferior parietal lobe. The hippocampus is the area between 
the collateral fissure and the hippocampal fissure. The para-
hippocampus is the hook-like part that surrounds the anteri-
or part of the hippocampal fissure. The fusiform gyrus is 
adjacent to the hippocampus and parahippocampus in the 
area between the inferior temporal sulcus and collateral fis-
sure. These data suggest vigorous information communica-
tion and neural connections between the hippocampus and 
parahippocam-pus gyrus due to the anatomical proximity. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the activation in 
the fusiform gyrus [19,20,49] is associated with some in-
sight tasks. Qiu et al. [20,49] successively adopted fMRI 
and ERPs to investigate the neural mechanism of insight 
problem solving. Their study revealed that prototype prob-
lem solving significantly activated the left fusiform gyrus in 
a prototype heuristic task, but target problem solving did not 
activate this brain region. A single character rearrangement 
task also demonstrated marked activation in the same region 
relative to the control condition. However, Aziz-Zadeh et al. 
[18] did not observe significant activation in this brain area 
in an fMRI study using a similar English single-word rear-
rangement task. The activity in the left fusiform gyrus was 
primarily associated with the breaking of mental set and the 
restructuring of Chinese characters chunks [49]. The present 
study argues that the fusiform gyrus participates in the for-
mation of novel and remote associations as a candidate of 
the hippocampus and STG. The following three reasons 
support this hypothesis. First, the fusiform gyrus is an im-
portant visual word form area (WFA) [51]. The activity of 
this region may be related to the visual processing of word 
forms because Zhang et al. [49] and Qiu et al. [20] demon-
strated some activation of the fusiform gyrus during the 
visual processing of word forms. The different results of the 
activation in the fusiform gyrus may be explained by dif-
ferences in experimental materials, but the neuroimaging 
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study of Aziz-Zadeh et al. [18] and other ERP/EEG studies 
[49,52] do not reveal activation in the same brain area. This 
difference is likely because Chinese characters (especially 
the Chinese pictophonetic characters) exhibit more visual 
features and prominence during processing compared to 
English words. However, Luo et al. [16] did not observe 
marked activation in the fusiform gyrus using a Chinese 
characters chunk decomposition task. Second, the fusiform 
gyrus is an important brain area that is responsible for face 
recognition [53,54]. This area is also involved in the theory 
of mind and intention inference [55–58]. The fusiform  
gyrus may exhibit a function similar to the STG in the the-
ory of mind [55,59], and it is primarily responsible for the 
identification and understanding of an actor’s intention on 
the basis of (potential) social clues. The difference is that 
the clues that are adopted by the STG to fulfill the above 
function are primarily derived from auditory and sound 
stimuli, but the clues that are adopted by the fusiform gyrus 
are primarily derived from facial and other visual stimuli 
(e.g., pictures). Clue identification and intention under-
standing require the integration of large amounts of infor-
mation and the connections between this information. Addi-
tionally, individuals mainly visually process problems at the 
moment of insight [2]. Thus, the fusiform gyrus may be 
involved in the formation of novel and remote associations. 
Finally, the hippocampus may not form novel and remote 
associations in isolation, but it requires cooperation from 
surrounding neural structures and connections. The fusiform 
gyrus is a key region near the hippocampus and STG, and it 
was naturally involved in the formation of novel associa-
tions. The distributed temporal regions and other brain areas, 
such as the temporoparietal junction, constitute a neural 
network that specializes in the formation of novel and re-
mote associations.   
In summary, existing research has observed a predomi-
nant activation in the hippocampus, STG and fusiform gy-
rus at the moment of insight. The temporal lobe is the criti-
cal neural basis for the cognitive processes that underlie 
creativity and creative expression. For example, a three- 
factor anatomical model suggests that the temporal lobe is 
primarily responsible for the formation of novel connections 
and the enhancement of connection quality [14,60,61]. Nu-
merous studies have demonstrated that the hippocampus, 
STG and fusiform gyrus participate in the formation of 
novel connections and remote associations. The hippocam-
pus, STG and fusiform gyrus may form a neural network 
that is responsible for the formation of novel and remote 
associations in insight problem solving. The hippocampus, 
STG and fusiform gyrus are responsible for the formation 
and construction of novel and remote associations of dif-
ferent types. The hippocampus is mainly responsible for the 
formation of novel associations based on previous experi-
ence and the knowledge that is in memory. The STG is pri-
marily involved in the formation of remote associations and 
novel connections from auditory and semantic elements. 
The fusiform gyrus primarily participates in the formation 
of novel images and remote associations based on visual 
imagery. These areas form an integrated network that spe-
cializes in novel connections and remote associations. How-
ever, these areas may also participate in other types of asso-
ciation and assist other nodes in the integrated network to 
generate and form novel associations through rich neural 
connections. More importantly, these areas generate and con-
struct more complex and rich novel images and associations. 
4  Precuneus and cuneus 
Precuneus and cuneus are two critical brain regions in in-
sight. Luo et al. [29] investigated the brain mechanisms that 
are involved in insight using a riddle guessing task and 
compared brain activations that corresponded to the solving 
of two kinds of puzzles. The solving of brainteaser puzzles 
that were constructed using different principles was associ-
ated with activation in the ACC, the left precuneus and oth-
er frontal brain areas compared to the resting baseline. The 
solving of “homophone” puzzles that were constructed us-
ing the same principle was associated with activities in the 
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and the left precuneus com-
pared to the resting baseline. No differences in the activa-
tion of the precuneus were noted. A neuroimaging study [2] 
on the brain mechanisms of brainteasers and encyclopedic 
knowledge problem solving revealed that the solving of the 
former problems exhibited more activation in the left 
precuneus compared to the latter problems, but the latter 
problems exhibited more activation in the bilateral cuneus 
compared to the former problems. Neuroimaging demon-
strated that [20] the solving of target riddles significantly 
activated the left precuneus compared to the solving of pro-
totype riddles. However, Luo and Niki [10] did not obtain 
similar results. These authors demonstrated that when the 
answers were presented to subjects, the solutions to brain-    
teasers, which require the breaking of mental set and the 
transformation of conventional thinking, significantly acti-
vated the right, but not the left, precuneus. Luo et al. [16] 
further investigated the roles of the cuneus and precuneus in 
insight problem solving using a novel chunk decomposition 
task. Chunk decomposition of TCD problems significantly 
and negatively activated the right cuneus compared to LCD 
problems. The TCD problems uniquely and negatively ac-
tivated the left and right cuneus compared to the LCD 
problems. Luo et al. suggested a constructive framework for 
interpretation [2] and proposed that the precuneus played a 
general strategy role in insight and routine problem solving. 
The precuneus may also work in conjunction with the cu-
neus, bilateral posterior middle temporal gyrus, and middle 
occipital gyrus. These brain regions formed a “non-verbal” 
visuospatial information processing network that associated 
with the effective transformation of problem representation. 
This hypothesis has been supported by numerous studies, 
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and it is typically exhibited in the following three aspects. 
First, the precuneus (including some areas of cuneus) is 
primarily involved in retrieval from working memory or 
episodic memory, especially the retrieval and processing of 
spatial images [62–65]. Second, numerous great scientific 
discoveries and inventions throughout human history have 
been non-verbal. For example, Einstein said “These thoughts 
did not come in any verbal formulation. I rarely think in 
words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in 
words afterward”. Finally, many traditional behavioral 
studies on protocol analysis and the feeling of knowing 
(FOK) in cognitive psychology also support the above hy-
pothesis [2]. FOK (e.g., feeling of warmth) cannot predict 
the time of the appearance of insight or “Aha!” in insight 
problem solving, but it accurately foresees the progress of 
routine problem solving. Some laboratory studies have also 
demonstrated that solvers usually remain silent for seconds 
or minutes before the flash of insight [2]. These studies in-
dicate that the insight may appear in a visual rather than 
auditory form.  
Darsaud et al. [25] adopted the NRT to investigate the 
brain mechanisms of rule finding. The entire course was 
divided into two stages according to the time point of the 
successful discovery of the hidden rule. The cognitive pro-
cess in the post-phase of rule finding exhibited more activa-
tion in the bilateral cuneus compared to the pre-phase (pri-
marily the seeking of the hidden rule). The process after a 
successful insight, (i.e., participants successfully identified 
the hidden rule and applied it to solve problems) signifi-
cantly activates the right precuneus relative to the solu-
tion-seeking process before insight. These results are similar 
to those of Oishi et al. [66] who examined the brain mecha-
nisms that are associated with the reduction in reaction time 
(RT) in serial reaction time tasks (SRTTs). Participants 
were instructed to press one of four buttons that corre-
sponded to visual stimuli as quickly as possible and with 
minimal errors during fMRI. Stimuli were presented either 
in random order (control condition) or in a repeated 6-item 
sequence (learning condition). Subjects with high RT re-
duction exhibited more prominent activation in the bilateral 
precuneus than subjects with low RT reduction. Intra-subject 
correlation analysis revealed that time course of precuneus 
activation was unrelated to the time course of RT reduction. 
However, inter-subject correlation analysis revealed that RT 
changes only correlated with precuneus activation, which 
suggests that subjects with more prominent RT reduction 
exhibited more prominent activation of the bilateral precu-
neus. The results illustrate that the bilateral precuneus 
played a critical role in the control of finger movements 
with reference to buffered memory [66,67]. The moment of 
insight or the successful finding of the implicit rule was 
determined by the sharp reduction in RT when the partici-
pants fulfilled the subsequent experimental task [25]. 
Therefore, the precuneus may participate in visual infor-
mation processing during the search and application of the 
hidden rule (i.e., the mirror rule) prior to and/or after the 
moment of insight. The precuneus may be involved in the 
formation and construction of a “non-verbal” visuospatial 
information- processing network in conjunction with the 
cuneus and other brain regions. However, the activation in 
the precuneus may also represent the rapid reduction in be-
havioral RT and its cortical control of finger movement. 
The above two alternative explanations of the roles of 
precuneus and cuneus in insight problem solving are sup-
ported by their anatomical locations. The precuneus is criti-
cally linked with the parietal lobe and cerebellum, and its 
neural efficacy is primarily determined by its anatomical 
connections and nerve conduction. The activation of areas 
of the precuneus or cuneus that are near and connected to 
the parietal lobe or the parietal regions (e.g., the left inferior 
parietal lobule) is primarily involved in visuospatial infor-
mation processing and working memory retrieval. The acti-
vation of this part of the precuneus or cuneus is likely in-
volved in the construction and formation of “non-verbal” 
visuospatial information processing network. The precuneus 
and the cuneus may not function in isolation, but these areas 
may work in concert with other visual areas that have been 
observed in previous studies, such as the inferior occipital 
gyrus and middle occipital gyrus [2,20,47,68]. However, the 
activation of areas of the precuneus or cuneus that are near 
the parietal lobe and connected to the cerebellum, which 
regulates motor control and movement, may assist in 
movement control, especially the cortical control of finger 
movement. Therefore, the specific roles of the precuneus 
and cuneus require further investigation. However, these 
areas surely participate in insight problem solving. Appro-
priate portions of the precuneus and cuneus should be in-
vestigated to accurately investigate the specific roles of dif-
ferent regions of the precuneus and cuneus (e.g., the region 
near the cerebellum or adjacent to the parietal lobe) in in-
sight problem solving.  
5  Insula and cerebellum 
The insula is a cortical part of the human brain with wide-
spread neural connections to the frontal cortex, temporal 
cortex and parietal cortex. However, the insula is very dif-
ficult to observe from a lateral view because of its anatomi-
cal position. The insula is the specific brain region that is 
responsible for disgust [69,70]. A meta-analysis of neu-
roimaging results on emotional processing revealed that the 
insula is also associated with threat-related emotions, such 
as fright [71,72]. Wager and Barrett [73] provided a detailed 
analysis on the role of different insular areas in cognitive 
process. The insula is engaged in the psychological pro-
cesses that underlie emotional experience, working memory 
and attention shift. The role of the insula in insight problem 
solving may be associated with the “Aha!” experience and 
the interactions between cognition and emotion in insight 
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problem solving.  
Luo et al. [15] observed that insight riddles activated the 
left insula compared to non-insight riddles in a Chinese rid-
dles guessing task. However, reverse comparisons failed to 
reveal activation in the same region. These results suggest 
that the left insula is specific for insight problem solving. 
Darsaud et al. [25] adopted the NRT to examine the brain 
activation that is engaged in rule finding and demonstrated 
that rule finding significantly activated the left insula. A 
real-time analysis of the entire time course of problem 
solving revealed that the post-phase of rule finding activated 
the posterior areas of the bilateral insula compared to the 
pre-phase. Wager and Barrett [72] demonstrated that the 
anterior insula was primarily responsible for attention shifts 
and working memory, the upper insula near the precentral 
gyrus primarily represented the emotional experience, and 
the posterior insular regions were primarily involved in the 
processing of somatosensory signals. These results suggest 
that the insula participates in the “Aha!” experience during 
insight problem solving. Aziz-Zadeh et al. [18] questioned 
this inference with the “feeling of warmth” effect of insight 
problem solving in the psychological literature. A signifi-
cant positive correlation between problem solving progress 
and the feeling of warmth during routine problem solving 
was observed. However, no similar correlations were noted 
during insight problem solving. In particular, when partici-
pants were consistently asked to describe how close they 
were to finding a solution for a given problem throughout 
the problem-solving time period, the effect of their reports 
on the two types of problem solving was different. For rou-
tine problem solving, participants commonly reported in-
creasing “warmth” as they were getting closer to the solu-
tion, and pieces of the solution became more apparent to the 
subject. In contrast, participants commonly reported a lack 
of warmth until the solution was suddenly reached as a 
whole, seemingly out of nowhere for insight problem solv-
ing. These inconsistent results suggest that the roles of the 
insula in insight problem solving require further examina-
tion. Aziz-Zadeh et al. divided the entire process of problem 
solving into three phases. The early stage was the interval 
from the presentation of the target stimulus to the subse-
quent 2.5 s, and the last stage was the 3 to 5.5 s post-target 
stimulus interval. A functional dissociation of insula regions 
across the two types of problem solving was observed; the 
right and left insula were activated for insight problem 
solving, but the left insula was uniquely activated in routine 
problem solving. The bilateral insulae were activated during 
insight solutions compared to resting, but the left insula did 
not exhibit significant activation in the comparison of rou-
tine problem solving with resting. These results imply that 
routine problem solving is primarily marked by the activa-
tion of the left insula, but insight problem solving is marked 
by the activation of bilateral insulae. The left insula may be 
involved in serial processing, and the right insula may be 
associated with gestalt processing because activation in the 
insula primarily occurred during the early stage. Different 
studies on insight have not reached a consensus on the func-
tion of insula in insight problem solving, but the right insula 
is important and necessary for insight problem solving. The 
present results support the view that creative insight reflects 
creativity, and studies commonly suggest that the right brain 
dominance theory in creative thinking is applicable for in-
sight problem solving [52]. Luo et al. [16] observed that 
LCD problem solving significantly exhibited more activa-
tion in the right insula than TCD problem solving. The ac-
tivations in both conditions were negative. Consequently, 
these results suggest that the right insula exhibits more neg-
ative activation during loose chunk decomposition problem 
solving. The negative activation of the right insula may be 
determined by the nature of initiative during problem solv-
ing. Specifically, LCD problems are mainly solved by par-
ticipants’ own initiatives, but TCD problems are primarily 
solved by the subsequently presented hints. The widespread 
connections between the insula and other cerebral regions 
and its unique location adjacent to the hippocampus and 
STG suggest that the insula may be responsible for sponta-
neous divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility during 
insight problem solving. The right insula would exhibit en-
hanced (negative) activation when the insight problem was 
solved using the subjects’ own thinking. The insula may 
also be linked with the “Aha!” experience [74], but it re-
quires further investigation. 
The cerebellum plays an indispensable role in insight. 
The cerebellum is a separate structure that is attached to the 
bottom of the brain beneath the cerebral hemispheres and 
behind the portion of the brainstem called the pons. The 
cerebellum plays a necessary and critical role in move-
ment-related functions, but it also participates in some cog-
nitive functions, such as attention and language, and the 
regulation of fear and pleasure responses. Some types of 
insight problems also activate the cerebellum. Goel and 
Vartanian adopted a traditional insight task (i.e., Matchstick 
Problems) to capture the brain activity that is associated 
with mathematical insight problems [7]. Insight problems 
activated the cerebellum, and this activation covaried with 
the number of solutions in Match Problems. The cerebellum 
was thought to be associated with the cortical control of 
finger movement because the acquisition of the solution 
required key pressing. Tian et al. [75] and Qiu et al. [20] 
adopted event-related fMRI to investigate brain mechanisms 
of mental preparation and prototype-induced insight, re-
spectively. Target problem solving exhibited more activa-
tion in the cerebellum than prototype problem solving. 
However, the activation in the cerebellum was not specific 
for insight problem solving because the cerebellum exhib-
ited different activations during different periods of problem 
solving. The cerebellum may be responsible for semantic 
storage and memory retrieval of the knowledge of prototype 
riddles during target problem solving [20,75]. Participants 
in this study were not required to press keys during the 
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study stage, but key presses were required to report the so-
lutions. The activation in the cerebellum may be associated 
with this response and may primarily reflect the cortical 
control of finger movement.  
6  Conclusion and future prospects 
Behavioral studies on insight problem solving have demon-
strated that complex problem-solving behavior is a cogni-
tive process based on the novel thinking and grasping of the 
entire problem situation or space, and insight is an “emer-
gent” rather than a “gradual” process. Cognitive neurosci-
ence studies have revealed that insight is a function of the 
human brain. Insight is complicated and special because it is 
currently unpredictable for meta-cognition, and it occurs as 
a sudden silence without verbal thinking in an all-or-none 
manner. The cognitive processes underlying insight cannot 
be accomplished by a single brain region. Insight is accom-
plished by distributed brain areas and the widespread con-
nections between these areas. These distributed brain re-
gions of insight form a functional network. The functional 
network relies on its neural or structural network [61,76]. 
Here, the structural base of the functional network of insight 
is the “insightful brain”. This putative framework is not an 
independent structural entity, but it is a neural network that 
is constructed by the distributed brain regions and neural 
substances and the neural connections between the distrib-
uted brain regions. The insightful brain involves many dis-
tributed brain regions, including the lateral prefrontal cortex, 
cingulate cortex (primarily the ACC and PCC), hippocam-
pus, superior temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, precuneus, 
cuneus, insula, cerebellum and some areas of the parietal 
cortex. The lateral prefrontal cortex is responsible for the 
mental set shift in insight problem solving. The cingulate 
cortex is involved in cognitive conflicts between new and 
old ideas and progress monitoring, and the hippocampus, 
superior temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus form an inte-
grated functional network that specializes in the formation 
of novel and effective associations. The effective transfor-
mation of problem representation depends on a non-verbal 
visuospatial information-processing network that comprises 
the precuneus and cuneus and other regions that are distrib-
uted in the parieto-occipital junction. The insula reflects 
cognitive flexibility and the emotional experience that is 
associated with insight, and the cortical control of finger 
movements relies on the cerebellum. The insightful brain is 
a complicated structural and functional system that forms a 
human brain functional network, or connectome, of many 
different structure-specific and function-related neural cor-
relates.  
Research on the insightful brain is a novel and sharply 
rising research area in the 21st century. This research was in 
its initial stage during the past decade (2003–2012), but this 
field has increasingly published innovative research. Natu-
rally, many worthy problems require further investigation. 
Some differences in the activation of areas in different 
studies and experimental tasks on creative insight have been 
observed. These inconsistencies may be related to the cog-
nitive processes that underlie different experiment tasks 
(e.g., riddles and puzzles, Chinese character-generation task), 
the different reference states (e.g., routine problem, unsuc-
cessful insight problem solving, no-Aha experience), or 
different test procedures (insight is a passive and active 
process) that were used in previous studies. Increased effort 
is required to develop and design a reference task that is 
more consistent with the characteristics of subtraction ex-
perimental designs. Future studies should strengthen the 
investigations on cognitive functions that are associated 
with the different brain regions that are involved in insight. 
Specifically, researchers can adopt a human connectome, 
structural equation modeling (SEM), dynamic causal mod-
eling (DCM) and granger causality analysis to investigate 
the connection modes and compatibility of different brain 
regions that are involved in insight and further illustrate the 
small-world neural network of the insightful brain [77]. 
More investigations on the interaction of cognition with 
emotion are required in future studies because (creative) 
insight includes cognitive and affective insight. The in-
sightful brain involves the cognitive and the emotional or 
affective brain as well as the neural connections between 
them. Additionally, researchers should further investigate 
the interaction of emotion and insight, especially the influ-
ence of emotions in insight problem solving [78,79]. Finally, 
a more general purpose for the study of the brain mecha-
nisms of creative insight is to decode creative thinking. 
Creative thinking and creativity play increasingly important 
roles in our daily life and social development. Research on 
insight may clarify some critical but unclear concepts and 
theories on creative thinking [2]. The four-stage model of 
Wallace and the geneplore model of Finke are well-known 
cognitive models of creative thinking. The former model 
includes a preparation stage, incubation stage, illumination 
stage and verification stage, and the latter model includes a 
generation stage and exploration stage. The neural mecha-
nisms that are correlated with these stages have not been 
investigated using different creative thinking tasks, but the-
se mechanisms have been explored using different creative 
insight paradigms and tasks [80,81]. Previous studies on the 
laterality or hemispheric effect of creative thinking have 
demonstrated that the left hemisphere is generally associat-
ed with analytical thinking, and the right hemisphere is as-
sociated with creative thinking. Some studies on insight 
problem solving support a right hemispheric dominance of 
insight [52], but most studies exhibit the left hemispheric 
effect of insight [82]. Both hemispheres are involved in cre-
ative insight, and the interaction between the two hemi-
spheres is critical. However, only the right hemisphere is 
uniquely responsible for creative insight. Future studies 
should adopt different paradigms and experimental tasks of 
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creative insight to further investigate the right hemispheric 
dominance theory and other theories on creative insight 
(e.g., neural efficiency hypothesis and inter-hemispheric 
interaction hypothesis [14]). Research on the insightful 
brain is an important method for the testing of relevant the-
ories of creative thinking, and it plays a critical role in in-
creasing scientific inventions and boosting social develop-
ment. Researchers will delineate the myth of insight using 
more innovative tasks and scientific paradigms in the near 
future.  
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